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IV. BUSINESS AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS – GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS
Zbigniew Tokarski* 
DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF FINES  
FOR CARTEL PARTICIPANTS IN THE EU
Abstract
Price-fixing, quota agreements, division of markets, the general cartel 
agreements, for years absorbed attention of economists and politicians 
who have been trying to work out effective policies to deal with this type of 
behavior. Despite these efforts, limiting the competition in the market through 
the creation of illegal agreements is still a common phenomenon in today's 
economy. To make sure that each participant of an illegal agreement will 
be justly punished multistage EC has developed a mechanism for calculating 
fines and systematically improves detection and level of penalties imposed to 
deter companies from violations of competition law.
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leniency procedure.
1. Introduction
Companies from various sectors in the European Union more and more 
often are coming into conflict with the competition law. Certain agreements 
are strictly prohibited, including: pricing and other terms of trade, setting the 
volume of production and the distribution and supply markets. The European 
Commission is trying to get rid of these agreements and to punish their 
participants.
After the discovery of a cartel the trial starts and the judgment is 
delivered and the fines imposed. Taking into account the case law of the 
European Commission one can conclude that the role of fines imposed on 
cartel participants is not only a punishment for past offenses, but it also deters 
companies from engaging in future, in an agreement that violates the law of 
competition.
The purpose of this article is a theoretical perspective on different types 
of anti-competitive agreements and to show the mechanism of calculating the 
fines applied by the European Commission. 
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2. Types of anti-competitive agreements
Agreements may be concluded by a company at different levels of turnover. 
If the contract is concluded by companies operating at the same level for, 
example: several manufacturers market the same product, then we are talking 
about a horizontal agreement. The purpose of such an agreement is usually the 
restriction of competition through joint coordination of marketing activities. 
Typical horizontal agreements of a price-fixing cartel are quota arrangements 
and a division of markets or purchase. Horizontal agreements are perceived by 
antitrust laws as the most harmful to the market and consumers. Therefore, such 
cases deserve to be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law in most civilized 
countries.
Agreements concerning price fixing directly or indirectly, fixing other 
conditions of business transactions, determining production volumes in relevant 
markets, technological development, the size and structure of investment 
participants in agreements or the division of markets or stores are all prohibited. 
Prohibited also are agreements leading to discrimination against trading 
partners outside an agreement and imposing additional conditions of trade 
agreements contrary to law and not connected with the transaction [Fornalczyk 
2007, pp. 87-88]
Illegal agreements may take the form of arrangements made in any way by 
individual entrepreneurs or their compounds. It is not uncommon that such an 
agreement is formulated like a civil contract or resolution by the Association 
of Entrepreneurs. However, if companies are aware that such an agreement is 
illegal, most arrangements are not usually put in written form, but are made 
orally in order not to leave any traces behind.
Among the most important types of anti-competitive agreements are:
a)  Price-fixing - directly and indirectly fixing prices and other conditions 
of purchase and sale of goods. The direct determination of the price 
level means for example introducing a minimum price for the product, 
while the indirect fixing of prices could mean for example setting 
margins, discounts, payment terms, dates, and the calculation of 
increases in prices [Connor 2001, s.91].
b)  Quota agreements - to reduce the production or development. In this 
type of agreement often the main idea is to reduce overproduction and 
to halt the decline in market prices. The mechanism of reaction rates 
on the volume of production can be traced by analyzing the decisions 
of any cartel. Participants in such an agreement start limiting their 
production and try to keep prices stable at a high level. The calculation 
of production, production limits and reduction capacity jointly by the 
parties to the agreement is strictly prohibited.
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c)  Division of a market or purchase - assigning each participant a specific 
area of an illegal agreement and establishing the market for each 
participant's percentage share of the market. Market allocation can be 
done by allocating customers and suppliers and limits on supply and sales 
in certain markets. Market allocation can be either territorial or subjective 
assortment. Cartels concluded by firms from different countries typically 
allow companies to maintain dominance in their home markets. Thus 
limiting competition, the company stabilize its profits, usually setting 
a price above the market rate.
d)  Restricting access to the market - characterized by unequal treatment 
by members of the agreement other market participants. In the most 
extreme form of such discrimination this may result in the elimination 
of companies which do not take part in a cartel from taking part further 
in the market. Restricting access to the market and the unequal treatment 
of partners may also be the objective of agreements and the use of other 
restrictive practices such as allocation of markets or collusion.
e)  Unrelated binding agreements - making the signing of a contract subject 
to acceptance by the other partner, the additional benefits that are not 
related to the subject matter of the contract. Such agreements occur 
frequently in large retail chains, which demand from smaller partners, 
the adoption of additional conditions in return for the opportunity to sell 
their goods in the chain.
f)  Bid-rigging - involving the joint establishment of companies concerning 
the detailed terms and conditions of its tender offer, the most common 
wage and price range. Bid-rigging may also be practiced between the 
organizer of an auction and one of the companies seeking the contract. In 
this case, collusion is the common setting of such tender conditions that 
favored one, the chosen company.
It must be added now that it is very important to remember that according to 
laws governing the right to fair competition, an operator is a person who conducts 
business. The method of financing and legal form of a project do not matter. 
However, according to antitrust laws it concerns business by trade industry 
organizations such as chambers, associations, corporations or associations 
governed by a broader context.
3. Calculation of fines
The perpetrators and participants of a detected cartel must be justly punished. 
Therefore, the Commission has developed a complicated procedure that allows 
the imposition of penalties on any company that brakes laws of competition. 
Penalties are monetary, but later in the article will be referred to also as fines.
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The method of setting fines for companies participating in a cartel consists 
of many steps. The Commission takes two basic elements into account when 
calculating amounts: deterring companies from violating these competition 
laws and the promoting of cooperation with the European Commission. 
According to guidelines on the prosecution of companies from 2006 [Reports 
on Competition Policy 2007, s.21-32] EC is obliged to calculate each fine for 
each individual participant in a cartel separately.
Initially the base amount is calculated. It consists of two basic elements. 
First, the level of significance is assessed a cartel and is awarded a value equal 
to the max. 30% of sales in the relevant year (usually takes into account the 
latest full year by the end of the cartel). Then this value is multiplied by the 
number of years of the cartel. The next step in calculating the base amount is 
the addition of another component called an additional amount, representing 
15-25% of annual sales company, in order to further deter companies from 
entering into illegal horizontal agreements. For the significance level and 
an additional amount was fixed at an appropriate level, the EC takes into 
account several factors such as market shares of the companies involved, the 
geographic scope of the cartel's structure and harm to society. First to be 
assessed is the level of significance of the cartel and its value is set equal to 
30% of the max. sales figures in the relevant year (the last full year before the 
end of the cartel is usually taken into account). This value is then multiplied 
by the number of years the cartel exists. The next step in calculating the 
base amount is by adding in another component called the “additional 
sum”, representing 15-25% of the annual sales of the company, with the 
aim of further deterring companies from entering into unlawful horizontal 
agreements. In order that the level of significance and additional amount are 
set at the right level, the EC takes into account several factors, such as market 
share of enterprises involved, the geographic scope of the cartel's structure 
and harm to society.
The base amount can then be increased or decreased depending on several 
elements. Mitigating circumstances may exist such as: cooperation with 
the European Commission, limited participation in the cartel, immediately 
exiting the cartel after its discovery by the EC. On the other hand, aggravating 
circumstances may also exist such as: the refusal to cooperate with the 
European Commission, leadership in the cartel, forcing other companies 
to participate in an illegal agreement, and especially repeat offences. 
Each previous violation of the laws of competition, for example, through 
participation in other cartels in the past, may increase the base amount by up 
to 100%.
Some cartels are very profitable and operate for many years, meaning that it 
may be more profitable for the company to invest money to participate in such 
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an agreement and then afterwards simply pay the additional fine. Therefore, in 
the end the EC may decide to increase the fine if high profits of cartel members 
involved are so large and the penalty so low as to have no detrimental effect on 
them. 
Other rules affecting the amount of the fine are: limiting it up to a max. 
10% of the global trade figures of the accused company in the year preceding 
the termination of the cartel and the possibility of mitigating the punishment 
that weakens the company and carries with it the only negative economic and 
social consequences in the region.
The greatest potential for reducing fines is participation in the leniency 
program. The commission may grant so called immunity from penalties 
(100% reduction or cancellation of all fines), assessed from participation in 
an agreement if:
a)  the company is the first to provide the Commission with sufficient 
evidence to begin proceedings. The immunity referred to in this 
section may be granted only if at the time the evidence is delivered, 
the EC did not already have enough evidence to start proceedings.
b)  the company is the first to provide the Commission with sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the law had been violated under article 81 
of the Treaty of the European Communities (TEC). The immunity 
referred to in this section may be imposed only if at the time the 
evidence is delivered, the EC did not already have sufficient evidence 
proving violation of the law according to art. 81 of the Treaty of the 
European Communities (TEC) in the cartel’s case or if so far none 
of the other companies have received immunity under the conditions 
previously from the point 1a., in the same case.
In addition to meeting the conditions of 1a or 1b, a company that is trying 
for immunity must respect the following principles:
a)  co-operation must be complete and continuous throughout the 
procedure conducted by the EC. The company must provide all the 
evidence relating to the matter pursued, which are in its possession.
b)  the company must terminate participation in the illegal cartel 
agreement before presenting evidence relating to the 1a or 1b.
c)  has not forced other companies to participate in the cartel.
A company that wishing to commence efforts to apply for immunity should 
contact the Directorate General for Competition, European Commission. If 
the company does not meet the conditions described in points 1. and 2., it 
will be immediately informed of the fact that immunity cannot be granted. 
In this case, the company may withdraw from the European Commission 
previously submitted evidence, or apply for a partial reduction of the penalty 
[see Hovenkamp, 1994, p.67-69].
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Until the process concerning application for immunity has been completed, 
the EC will not consider any other requests for immunity relating to the matter 
under consideration.
Companies applying for immunity, but did not meet all the requirements, 
usually have a second opportunity to reduce the penalty. In order for a reduction 
to be granted, several important conditions must be met. The company applying 
for a reduction in EC penalty must provide evidence that it would represent 
a significant value compared to the material already held by the European 
Commission. Moreover, such a company must terminate its participation in all 
agreements before delivery of the previously mentioned evidence.
The level of reduction in penalty is determined in % and amounts to:
a) 30-50% for the first company that meets the conditions described above
b) 20-30% for the other company which fulfills the conditions
c) up to 20% for any other company which fulfills the conditions.
In a) and b) we may observe a large range of interest. The exact level of 
the reduction is decided by the European Commission taking into account the 
time taken to provide evidence and its importance to the ongoing investigation. 
Before considering applications by companies to reduce the penalty, the 
European Commission is required to deal with applications for granting 
immunity in the case.
After determining the level of fines, the company can appeal the judgment 
to the appropriate court and request a reduction in penalty. Referencing is 
a common and often effective practice among companies fined.
4. The number of detected cartels and fines
Competition policies implemented by various countries are not identical 
to each other. However, typically legal systems prohibit firms in certain 
activities and agreements between undertakings that violate the rules of market 
competition. In the European Union rules concerning agreements are governed 
by the Treaty of the European Communities.
According to this treaty horizontal agreements are considered to be harmful 
to both the economy and for individual consumers. All this makes the fight 
against cartels one of the main elements of competition policy pursued by the 
European Commission (EC).
As shown in Chart 1, for the period 2003-2010 the European Commission 
issued 51 decisions on cartels and fined a total of 344 companies.
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Table 1. Commission decisions issued in the years 2003-2010
year No. of Commission 
Decisions Issued in 
the years 2003-2010
The number of 
companies fined by 
the EC
2003 5 26
2004 6 29
2005 5 41
2006 7 47
2007 8 45
2008 7 37
2009 6 43
2010 7 76
total 51 344
Source: own study based on: http://europa.eu.int (25.04.2012).
Penalties to companies by the EC are a heavy burden for companies. Chart 
2 indicates the sum of total fines imposed on cartels in a given year. The data in 
this table include the level of fines taking into account fine reductions associated 
with the leniency procedure, but before the appeal court.
Table 2. Fines imposed on cartels by the Commission members for the period 
2003-2010
year The amount of fines imposed on cartels 
(thousands of Euro)
2003 400,791 
2004 368,753
2005 683,029
2006 1,846,385 
2007 3,334,003 
2008 2,270,310 
2009 1,622,986 
2010 3,101,218 
Source: own study based on: http://europa.eu.int (25.04.2012).
The commission assumes that some of the companies participating in 
the illegal agreements may be willing to end its participation in the cartel 
and provide comprehensive information on its operation, but do not opt to do 
so for fear of high penalties that are likely to be imposed on them. The EC 
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said that in the interest of the Community milder treatment would be shown 
to companies which, although involved in the cartel, ceased operations and 
agreed to cooperate with the EC. In other words, the benefits of assisting in 
detecting cartel are so great that it warrants establishing a law preventing or 
mitigating penalties for companies involved in the illegal agreement, if they 
make a significant contribution to inhibiting cartel operations.
In order to encourage companies to cooperate in the described situation in 
the preceding paragraph, the EC in 1996 introduced a provision on immunity 
(called leniency), and reduction of fines in cartel cases [Barlingen 2003, p.54-
59]. After five years of applying this procedure, the EC decided to modify it. 
The procedure confirmed its effectiveness, but the Commission concluded that 
it could be improved by introducing more transparency, so that firms were more 
confidence of being granted immunity, or even partial reduction of the sentence 
for cooperation. Thus there was a closer relationship between the degree to 
which a penalty is reduced and the degree of co-operation with the European 
Commission [Report on Competition Policy 2007, p.11].
During the first 10 months of the operation of the revised procedures for 
leniency, there were 10 European cartels detected, which shows clearly the 
high effectiveness of this type of regulation. The introduction of the leniency 
procedure complicated the process of calculating the fine, but significantly 
contributed to destabilization of the cartels, introducing an additional element of 
uncertainty and fear, due to the fact that each of the participants in an unlawful 
agreement could choose to cooperate with the Commission.
  
5. Conclusion
Price-fixing, quota agreements, division of markets and cartel agreements 
in general have been key issues for many years for economists and politicians, 
who have been trying to work out effective methods of dealing with this type of 
phenomena. Despite their efforts, reducing competition in the market through 
the creation of illegal agreements are still prevalent in today's economy.
The European Commission is trying to keep up with the regulations, making 
it easier to combat cartels. To ensure that each participant in an illegal agreement 
is punished justly, the European Commission has developed a mechanism for 
calculating fines and systematically improving detection rates and the level of 
penalties imposed to deter companies from breaking competition laws. The 
introduction of a fine leniency procedure for the reduction of fines in return for 
cooperation complicated the procedure. However, there has been a significant 
impact on the destabilization of the cartels, by introducing an additional 
element of uncertainty and fear, resulting from the fact that any participant in an 
unlawful agreement now has the option of cooperating with the Commission. 
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Current legal solutions allow the Commission to impose a penalty equal to 
10% of the company's revenue for the year preceding the decision. Statistics 
show that the Commission increasingly uses the law and imposes the maximum 
sentence, arguing that the high and the inevitable punishment for participating 
in a cartel is the only way to discourage companies from entering into unlawful 
agreements.
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